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placed upon it. This article outlines why our knowledge of environmental processes is inadequate and 
addresses the rationale and content of the "precautionary principle", tracing its development from an 
uncontroversial espousal of commonsense to its emergence as a potentially forceful decision-making 
norm. It will be argued tliat although the principle has definitional and implementational shortcomings, it 
has the capacity to inform environmental practices systematically as the basis of a regulatory regime — 
not merely at the policy level. 
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Environmental Protection and the 
"Precautionary Principle": A Response to 
Scientific Uncertainty in Environmental 
Management 
WARWICK GULLETT 
LLB, BA (Hons), Monash, PhD Candidate Australian National University 
The principle of precautionary action has been presented by some of its advocates as nothing 
less than a monumental paradigm shift in environmental management. It is essentially a 
new legal response to the scientific uncertainties surrounding the capacity ofthe environment 
to cope with the increasing demands placed upon it. This article outlines why our knowledge 
of environmental processes is inadequate and addresses the rationale and content of the 
"precautionary principle ", tracing its development from an uncontroversial espousal of 
commonsense to its emergence as a potentially forceful decision-making norm. It will be 
argued tliat although the principle has definitional and implementaiional shortcomings, it 
has the capacity to inform environmental practices systematically as the basis of a regulatory 
regime — not merely at the policy level. 
The proposition that states are responsible for authority for the proposition that every state has an 
transboundary environmental harm, now incorporated obligation "not to allow knowingly its territory to be 
in numerous United Nations resolutions and regional used for acts contrary to the rights of other states".4 
treaties, was first articulated with some degree of Although the Trail Smelter principle became 
specificity in 1941 in the landmark Trail Smelter entrenched in international law, the extent to which 
Arbitration* decision. At issue was whether Canada the rule of liability has improved state environmental 
was liable for the transboundary effects of sulphur practices has been limited for three reasons. First, 
dioxide emissions from a copper smelter within its liability does not arise unless there is a wrongful act. 
jurisdiction. The emissions had, over a period of 12 It arises only when harm has occurred and this was 
years, caused damage to farmlands and crops in the reasonably foreseeable. Secondly, the environmental 
United States. The tribunal awarded the United States harm must be "serious". Thirdly, evidentiary problems 
compensation and stated: arise in the establishment of causation. States have 
"rvn o* · u *L · u** x.u r often maintained that they are not required to act to 
[NJo State has the right to use or permit the use of , ., t4 , . . . „ . ..<-. . . ö F . . prevent harm until clear and convincing scientific 
its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by ^ 1 . , . , . . , . , « τ 
£ . , . . ' , proof of actual or threatened harm is adduced, mone fumes in or to the territory of another or the , ^ .. 0 , , . . . L - L L r respect, even the Trail Smelter decision is not as 
properties or persons therein, when the case is of . w- * * L ^ A U A • A 
. j , . . ,,. . . significant as it appears because Canada had accepted 
serious consequence and the injury is established ,•,.,. A. . r A-A * 6 , . ,M . j ·· / L - liability so the issue of causation did not arise.6 
by clear and convincing evidence (emphasis A . ,. . . ^ L · .· ι ι L · AA A\2 Another limitation of the existing legal approach is 
that the standard of liability for harm caused to the 
This formulation of state liability — akin to the territory of another state is not the onerous one of 
common law principle of "good neighbourliness" — strict (or no-fault) liability, but a fuzzy question of 
was extended beyond air pollution to other injurious "due diligence".7 This term is generally understood 
acts by the decision of the International Court of as imposing an obligation on states to promote "good 
Justice in the Corfu Channel Case? This case is governance", which, in the environmental arena, is 
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interpreted as requiring action to abate or prevent to predictions of environmental outcomes is a 
further transboundary harm. Although states must combination of the difficulties associated with 
restrict the use of their territory so as not to harm other analysing complex systems and the nature of scientific 
states, if harm does occur, a state will only be required inquiry itself. 
to pay compensation where the harm was brought Uncertainty abounds in our understanding of the 
about through a lack of proper care. This standard environment, from the local and discrete level through 
falls far short of guaranteeing prevention of harm. For to processes which are transboundary or global, 
example, if diligent control over resources is Although there is a degree of scientific uncertainty 
exercised, but nevertheless harm is caused to another regarding the precise nature of every human impact 
state (such as where it was not reasonably foreseeable), on the environment, uncertainty is more pronounced 
the harm will be regarded as lawful.8 Further, (and has the potential to be more far-reaching) at the 
international law imposes no obligation on states to global level where the complexity of environmental 
prevent environmental harm within their borders. relationships severely tests understanding. Science is 
This situation, in which states are able to avoid not equipped to comprehend fully the spatial and 
acting to minimise environmental damage until after temporal intricacies of ecosystems which are 
it has been caused or is inevitable, has been widely characterised by interdependence of countless 
criticised in international environmental discourse. physical processes and non-linear responses to change. 
The inadequacies of the existing environmental Uncertainty arises where baseline data are unavailable 
regulatory regime have been particularly acute in cases or incomplete due to time or resource constraints or 
where environmental harm resulted from the where there are environmental agents which simply 
cumulative effects of a number of activities over a are incapable of being monitored or monitored over a 
long period (such as acid rain). Compensatory redress sufficiently long period. Not only does uncertainty 
in such circumstances is almost impossible arise regarding the dynamics of the physical 
considering the hurdles in remoteness and environment, it also arises in relation to the human 
foreseeability of damage which must be overcome. environment: we cannot be certain about the shape of 
There has been increasing acceptance of the need for future societies and we cannot predict the capability 
a more effective legal framework that would require and extent of response to environmental exigencies.10 
states to take stringent measures to deal with when environmental management decisions are 
environmental problems. Corresponding with growing m a de, such as when regulators are introducing new 
disquiet about the existing reactive approach to policies or clarifying liability for environmental harm, 
environmental damage, support has grown for a m u c h demand is placed on scientists to establish 
proactive approach to ensure action is taken to reduce "proof of cause and effects. Yet, in many cases, this 
environmental impacts before they occur. This article i s a fruitless search for an infinite series of events, 
will outline the difficulties encountered by decision- χ ^ multicausal nature of environmental processes 
makers in the field of environmental regulation and m i i i t a tes against neat findings of causation. For 
examine the leading policy approach — precaution example, a particular pollutant may be linked 
— which has emerged to guide them. conclusively to a particular effect, but it is unlikely to 
_ . ... . . . , be exclusively responsible, and the degree to which it 
Scientific uncertainty in environmental i s reSponsible may be indeterminable. Evidence of 
management causation is always open to be refuted, disputed or 
Policy-makers invariably seek uncontested otherwise undermined, 
information as a basis for decision-making, often Despite these limitations, scientists do produce 
drawing on "objective" scientific evidence. impressive evidence with all the appearance of 
Environmental management is particularly dependent objectivity. Yet, ambiguity, subjectivity and 
on scientific evidence and expertise — without it there assumptions are inherent in scientific methods and 
would be no basis for environmental regulation.9 Yet interpretations.!1 As there are no indisputably "correct" 
environmental regulators routinely are presented with methods for obtaining environmental data, findings 
inconclusive or ambiguous evidence and divergent will always be open to challenge or differing 
opinions as to the likely environmental impacts of interpretation. For example, findings invariably are 
particular activities. The uncertainty which attaches ascribed less weight where the methodology used is 
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generally accepted as not the best available. Further, statistically unlikely, is possible — and believable — 
in many environmental disputes, both "sides" normally and should not readily be discounted. A limitation of 
can produce scientific evidence to support their case.n risk analyses is that they assume that we can quantify 
Where scientists disagree on the evidence itself, or in accurately the statistical likelihood and magnitude of 
respect of the correct interpretation of it, there may environmental harm. However, the majority of 
be little basis upon which to conclude that either environmental problems suffer from uncertainty and 
argument is correct. Favouring "majority" evidence the magnitude of uncertainty can render meaningless 
(if a clear majority can be found) may be the only any assessment of environmental risks.19 
permissible approach for decision-makers, but it must 
be acknowledged that a degree of uncertainty will A degree of certainty 
attach to any approach adopted. Notwithstanding the inevitability of conflicting 
interpretations of scientific evidence and gaps in 
Uncertainty in prediction of environmental scientific knowledge, there are often areas of general 
outcomes agreement, such as in overall environmental trends. 
A corollary of our inability to understand the vast Uncertainty normally is restricted to the extent of 
range of environmental interactions is that we will threatened environmental damage rather than whether 
never be able to make accurate long-term predictions human activities are contributing to such damage.20 
about all the consequences of human activities on So, we may be able to identify with certainty particular 
natural systems. Not all environmental change can be threats to the environment but remain uncertain as to 
anticipated and any predictions must be provisional. the scale of potential ecological, social or economic 
The limitations of science have been illustrated by disturbance. For example, there is no disagreement 
the history of the ozone debate. On the one hand, we among scientists that there has been a global increase 
were reliant on science for discovering ozone in ambient concentrations of atmospheric carbon 
depletion, yet on the other, the scientific community dioxide,21 but the full implications of this phenomenon 
entirely failed to predict this phenomenon. Other are unknown. Although we have recourse to a 
phenomena, including global warming and considerable body of knowledge on environmental 
biodepletion, have been predicted in general terms matters to inform environmental practices, there needs 
but remain insufficiently understood.13 to be awareness ofthe limitations of such knowledge. 
All predictions of environmental harm are presented 
in probabilistic terms. Yet, it is necessary to A response to scientific uncertainty: the 
differentiate between risk'4 of environmental harm and "precautionary principle" 
true uncertainty15 regarding environmental To avoid the paralysis of decision-makers when 
outcomes.16 Cameron explained that it does not confronted with uncertainty, the "precautionary 
necessarily follow that an event with a high risk of principle" emerged in environmental discourse as a 
occurrence is accompanied by a high level of new approach to environmental protection, providing 
uncertainty. High risk may be associated with an event the "philosophical authority to take decisions in the 
either with a high probability of occurrence with face of uncertainty".22 It is rooted in misgivings about 
consequences which are known to be relatively scientific interpretations of environmental tolerance 
innocuous, or a low probability of occurrence with of human activities and accepts uncertainty regarding 
consequences which are known to be relatively environmental outcomes as a sufficient reason for 
serious.17 Conversely, there may be much uncertainty action, recognising that we should not wait for 
about the full consequences of an event which is conclusive proof of environmental harm before 
assigned a low probative value of occurring (thus adopting appropriate avoidance measures. The 
considered to be virtually no "risk"). For example, principle moves away from utilitarian approaches to 
justifications for new nuclear power stations typically the environment by recognising the intrinsic value of 
include the statement that the risk of explosion is ecosystems and requiring environmental protection 
statistically insignificant.18 Yet the full ramifications as a "moral right".23 It is the best legal response to the 
of such an event can only be speculated upon. Further, "tragedy of the commons"24 dilemma. It seeks 
perceptions of risk vary and the spectre of another collective environmental responsibility and effectively 
Chernobyl catastrophe, although often dismissed as imposes an environmental duty of care to prevent 
54 
1997 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE "PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE" 
spatially or temporally distant harm. It is closely November 1987 in the London Declaration of the 
associated with the polluter pays principle and Second International Conference on the Protection of 
intergenerational equity. Gro Harlem Brundtland, the North Sea.33 The participants accepted that 
former Prime Minister of Norway and chair of the M. , . . .., XT ^. c <. U 1 
„. . . _ ^ . t m order to protect the North Sea from possibly 
World Commission on Environment and , r / . „.. . , u . 
^ 1 , . , damaging effects of the most dangerous substances, 
Development, encapsulated the precautionary a t i h i s n e c e w h i c h m a y 
pnnciple thus: If we err in our decisions affecting . * · * * _ ! · * c u u • 
IL η * L-I J Λ , , require action to control inputs of such substances 
the future of our children and our planet, let us err on e v e n ^ ^ & ^ ^ h a s ^ e s t a b H s h e d b 
the side of caution. 25 , . . . . . ..~ ., 
_ „ absolutely clear scientific evidence. 
The premise ofthe pnnciple is that activities should 
not be permitted where there is uncertainty regarding The parties then put this principle into effect by 
their effects and there is reason to believe harm may agreeing to reduce 
result. Thus, once an activity is identified as posing a « p o I l u t i n g emissions of substances that are 
potentialthreaUecsion-makersshouldberisk-averse p e r s i s t e n t ) t o x i c ^ l i able to bioaccumulate at 
and wait to be convinced that the risk is acceptable s o u f c e b y t h e u s e o f t h e ^ a v a ¡ l a b l e t e c h n o l o g y 
before allowing it. Also, where there is existing a n d o t h e r a p p r o p r i a t e measures. This applies 
potential for environmental harm, the principle eSpeCially when there is reason to assume that 
requires anticipatory remedial measures to be c e r t a i n d a m a g e o r hmnM e f f e c t s o n ^ U v i n g 
undertaken. Perrings termed this "reserved resources of the sea are likely to be caused by such 
rationality": we should proceed cautiously to substances, even where there is no scientific 
safeguard against the possibility of unexpectedly evidence to prove a causal link between emissions 
severe future costs.26 a n d effects ('the principle of precautionary 
Origin and rise ofthe principle actlon '' 
The origin of the principle lies in the German ""» PrinciP le h a s 0 ^ 1 1 advanced most successfully 
concept of Vorsorgeprinzip (literally "precautionary i n r e l a t i o n t 0 m a r i n e Portion35 but has also been 
principle" or "foresight principle"),27 espoused in the aPP , ied t o weas i n c , u d i nS hazardous wastes,36 climate 
mid-1960s in response to concerns about pollution change," ozone depletion,38 biodiversity,39 fisheries 
levels. In the early 1970s it could be found in domestic management40 and general environmental 
West German legislation.28 It was employed by the management.41 Arguably the Rio Declaration on 
West German government to justify vigorous Environment and Development42 (signed by over 170 
strengthening of environmental protection policies, countries) is the most significant international 
notably to combat acid rain, global warming and ^cognition of the principle43 and the most accepted 
marine pollution.29 formulation. Pnnciple 15 states: 
Since the late 1980s, the principle has become "In order to protect the environment, the 
established at the forefront of international precautionary approach shall be widely applied by 
environmental discourse. It has appeared frequently States according to their capabilities. Where there 
in academic literature and is referred to in numerous ^e threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack 
international policy documents and domestic 0f full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
environmental management strategies. At the reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
international level, precautionary thinking is evident prevent environmental degradation." 
in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment, which recognised the need to safeguard An appropriate response to scientific 
natural resources, through careful planning and uncertainty 
management, for the benefit of future generations,30 There is vigorous debate in the literature regarding 
and the 1982 World Charter for Nature,3 ' which stated whether the principle is a scientifically sound approach 
that activities "likely to pose a significant risk to which is adequate to deal with uncertainty, or whether 
nature" should not proceed where "potential adverse .it is purely a political concept with little practical 
effects are not fully understood".32 The first explicit application. Gray argued that the principle "has 
international endorsement of the principle came in nothing to do with science" because it is a wholesale 
55 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND PLANNING LAW JOURNAL FEBRUARY 
rejection of scientific methodology as a basis for consequences of unknown, but potential, harm. No 
decision-making.44 It is seen as undermining optimism apology is offered for such "costs" being incurred, 
that science can solve environmental problems. Yet, Further, the principle does not abandon scientific 
as Cameron argued, the actual limitations of scientific evidence. All formulations of the principle require 
endeavour provide an argument for the application of some indication that harm may result before the burden 
precaution.45 The polarisation of views among the shifts to the proponent of an activity to negate the 
commentators centres on the issue of whether possibility of unacceptable harm. For example, the 
precautionary action should be taken in the absence formulation in the North Sea Declaration asserts the 
of scientific proof of causal links between activities need to apply the principle "to avoid potentially 
and environmental harm.46 Gray is concerned by the damaging impacts" of toxic substances. A high level 
rejection of statistical predictions (or "scientific of scientific understanding is required before the 
evidence") of environmental outcomes in favour of principle can be applied in weaker formulations, such 
acceptance of mere "suspicion of effects" as sufficient as in the Rio Declaration, where the threshold for 
for the introduction of precautionary measures. This application is threats of "serious or irreversible 
is perceived as taking objectivity out of the process.47 damage". Precaution is not "unscientific" but the 
He warned against "crying wolf and referred to the principle does recognise that decisions often need to 
North Sea Declaration formulation of the principle be made in the absence of adequate scientific 
(where precautionary measures are to be introduced information, 
"even where there is no scientific evidence") as an 
example of "unnecessary precaution".48 Likewise, A new environmental standard: rejection of 
Wildavsky, who was a prominent critic of the assimilation theory 
principle, described it as a "marvellous piece of There is considerable debate whether the principle 
rhetoric" which supports the elimination of activities is a paradigm shift in environmental management or 
which could cause harm, thus reducing decision- whether it merely institutionalises commonsense 
making to a "hedging mechanism". He believed that practices. Conventional environmental policies are 
there is no need to be prepared for all possible deeply influenced by assimilation theory, whereby it 
eventualities: "why organize our lives around is assumed that ecosystems can tolerate a certain 
predictions unlikely to come true?"49 Brunton, another amount of pollution without detrimental changes to 
opponent of the principle, argued that the best strategy overall quality.51 The "assimilative capacity" concept 
for dealing with uncertainty would be to develop is used universally by regulators when calculating 
"resilience" by increasing our understanding by trial permissible waste discharges. By definition, 
and error. In fact, he contended that a conservative discharges purportedly are made without unacceptable 
"do-nothing" approach, "which would seem to be the harm.52 We are compelled to rely on the assimilative 
one supported by the precautionary principle", may capacity of the environment to some degree because 
ultimately prove to be "unacceptably risky".50 In a human societies will produce wastes and continue to 
sense, Brunton argued for a reverse precautionary cause environmental impacts. This is implicit in the 
principle — that we should not prevent certain Trail Smelter decision where liability attached only 
activities because they might reap unknown benefits. to "serious" injury.53 
Gray, Wildavsky and Brunton misdirect their attack Although rarely is it disputed that the environment 
on the principle. They view its application as ensuring has some capacity to tolerate human activities, the 
the loss of profits and opportunities which are traded assimilative capacity concept does not provide 
off for benefits which are unquantifiable, distant and adequate protection against environmental harm.54 A 
possibly non-existent. In doing so, they place little major shortcoming is that it assumes critical thresholds 
weight on the higher penalties which may be incurred of environmental capacity can be determined, 
by society as a whole and by future generations. The However, there are many examples of discharges 
principle recognises that inaction in the face of which were predicted to be safe (including CFCs and 
uncertainty may be far worse than corrective action DDT) later causing unanticipated long-term damage, 
which is taken too late to be effective. It is implicit in The precautionary principle essentially is a new and 
the acceptance of precautionary philosophy that some progressive policy vehicle which represents a 
opportunities will be foregone in order to avoid the philosophical shift from the assimilative capacity 
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concept towards a more protectionist approach to international law instruments,60 when it is incorporated 
maintaining environmental quality. It is far more in binding conventions, it often is contained in non-
attentive to the possibility of irreversible operative provisions or is relaxed and expressed in 
environmental damage. It cannot, and does not, permissive terms.61 The question is whether, in the 
purport to eliminate unanticipated harm or provide a absence of a mandatory treaty provision, a state is 
panacea for our environmental ills. Its use is in required to implement the principle under customary 
facilitating prudent decision-making when confronted international law. 
with scientific uncertainty. A number of commentators have suggested that, 
because strong evidence of state practice and opinio 
The principle as a legal principle j u r i s is absent and because the parameters of the 
Although the principle advances a progressive principle remain elusive, it is doubtful whether the 
policy approach to environmental management, as a principle is part of customary international law, or even 
legal concept it is not as radical as it may appear. whether it can evolve into an international canon of 
International environmental law already addresses environmental practice.62 Others have argued that, 
some aspects of precaution.55 In fact, the principle is because the principle has been invoked so frequently 
best understood as a development of existing legal in international environmental resolutions, it has 
obligations rather than a departure from them.56 The crystallised into a basic normative principle of 
existing preventive principle in international law international law.63 As the principle has been expressly 
obliges states to abstain from conduct which carries adopted in a plethora of international instruments (as 
"significant risk" of "reasonably foreseeable" harm. well as being endorsed implicitly in many more), it 
Further, international jurisprudential developments of seems any doubt as to its legal validity goes to 
the Trail Smelter doctrine have expanded the determining its specific requirements rather than to 
requirements of due diligence to include the obligation its existence as a principle of law. Freestone argued 
to investigate the likelihood of environmental harm that the "bottom line" is that a state which has endorsed 
and to assess whether risk of harm is serious.57 the principle would be liable if it caused harm in the 
The innovative quality of the precautionary future through activities which today are strongly 
principle lies in the requirement of prevention not only suspected (but not proven) to cause substantial harm.64 
where there is "significant risk" of harm, but also This opinion is relevant for Australia, which has 
where there is uncertainty whether harm will result. adopted the principle by signing a number of 
The preventive principle requires risk and causation international documents which contain it, including 
to be scientifically proven; the precautionary principle the Rio Declaration. For those states which have not 
extends the preventive requirements of due diligence assumed the responsibility to implement the principle, 
where there is uncertainty as to environmental their environmental conduct should nonetheless be 
outcomes. Giindling argued that it is a more stringent influenced by it because its entrenched status as "soft" 
form of preventive environmental policy because it international law means that increasingly it will shape 
requires action "irrespective of the existence of risks". future determinations of international legal liability. 
Although risks are relevant, "the crucial point is that 
environmental impacts are reduced or prevented even Interpreting the principle 
before the threshold of risks is [sic] reached". Thus, Notwithstanding the almost universal acceptance 
he argued, precautionary action must be taken even o f t h e principle in recent international documents 
where risks are "not excluded".58 Yet this interpretation concerned with environmental management, there is 
of the application of the principle is too wide. It is considerable confusion as to what is meant by the 
inconsistent with most formulations which do not call concept. No commonly agreed definition exists, nor 
for action unless there is some indication non- criteria to guide its implementation.65 This prompted 
negligible environmental harm may result.59 o n e commentator to describe it as the "fuzziest" of 
rrj ^ ^ r^ . , . . . . environmental principles.66 Bodansky argued that the 
The status ofthe principle in international p r i n c i p l e i s t o o v a g U e t o serve as a regulatory standard 
because it does not define the vital concept of 
Although it is common for the principle to be precaution or specify how much precaution should 
formulated in mandatory terms in non-binding "soft" be taken.67 The uncertainties surrounding its content 
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and implications stem from its numerous formulations determining what is the "best available" technology 
and the ambiguous wording typically used in because of continuous advances in technology and 
statements of policy. The generality of the principle because the concept only permits precautionary action 
has led to criticism that it is devoid of practical where it is technologically and economically feasible. 
meaning.68 However, others have pointed to an Further, use of BAT may not give proper effect to the 
undisputed conceptual basis to which effect can be principle. Outright prohibition of activities may be 
given. O' Riordan and Jordan, for example, identified preferable.73 However, applying strict precaution and 
the core ofthe principle as: insisting on zero discharge of pollutants does not 
u r T 1 , · . · . · , · ι · . L Λ · · ι eliminate risk and can be counter-productive. For [TJhe intuitively simple idea that decision makers I L L · CU Α .Α- ι * 
u ΊΑ * · A c -r- example, the banning of hazardous waste disposal at 
should act in advance of scientific certainty to . . . . . . , ι j · t 
. ... . . . . . . . . . . sea results in increased disposal on land, simply 
protect the environment (and with it the well-being r . . . ... / . . XT .u Γ ^ , , - - ν £_ . L transferring risk. As an illustration, in Norway there 
interests of future generations) from incurring harm. L U « L I J L *L J- L C , T L - I - J has been considerable debate over the discharge of 
... In essence, it requires that risk avoidance .. , . . . . , £. ... . . .ι- ι Λ J · . . . ilmeni te (a black mineral composed of iron titanium 
becomes an established decision norm where there .. x ,. . . . . . . . , . . . . . ,. .tt oxide), which is insoluble and accumulates in water, is reasonable uncertainty regarding possible . . ^ . . . . , ., . 
. . . j . . but is non-toxic. Environmental groups insisted that 




 F & it is a pollutant because not all its effects on manne 
out of a proposed course of action. 6^ ,. , _. . . ... . . . . . , 
biota are known. They argued that it should be stored 
Content of the principle in a specially constructed dam on land. On the other 
c , .. r.u .. . . , . . hand, local residents and a number of marine biologists Formulations of the precautionary pnnciple tend , , . r J 
. . . . . ¿ . u : c Γ * u have been opposed to the construction of a dam, 
to be hortatory in character, but, for it to be . . . . . . , . . . 
, . , r- . L I arguing that it would be too costly and would have its implemented, a specific and operable content must fe . . . . 
UÀ. -A ^L- . ι Λ JjCr- , L L -J own environmental impacts and further, that the be determined. This task is made difficult by the wide . r . . . . . · , 74 A i- *· 
€ . . . . L- L XL - , L L dumping ofilmenite at sea is not nsky. Application range of obligations which the principle has the * L . · ι · . · ι A A L * * A . 
. .. . . „ j . . . of the pnnciple is controversial and debate tends to 
potential to impose. Consensus needs to be arrived at , . r . .. . .... c ..~ .. , c . . . r r . , , . . devolve to the acceptability of different levels of as to the type of regulatory approaches which are _ . , Ώ . , . .u . .u . . . . . F . . , J F F . . , uncertainty. Bodansky argued that the pnnciple is 
appropriate for its implementation in particular .. . . . . . . . . . . 
Γ I.. , . . . . normally misconceived as a choice between nsk and 
circumstances. At minimum, the principle is . . ^ . . . . . , 
j , . J ^ . caution, when often it is a choice between one risk 
understood as requiring the adoption of sound . .. 7 5 w . u . . . ^*u„* 
. ^ 1 1 , \ . . and another.
75 It is perhaps more accurate to state that 
environmental practices and the reduction of emissions . . . r 4lf Γ . . n . , 
r „
 r . L . . . j ^ application of the principle normally involves 
ofpolutantsatsource-althoughothermethodsfor a c c e p t i n g a W n r i s k of environmental h a r m t o guard 
directly and indirectly implementmg precaution have ¡ n s ( mmcemin enviro„mental outcome (possibly 
been advanced. These include stnngent environmental . • . ^ 
quality objectives, the principle of non-degradation, & 
strict prohibition or cradle to grave care with regard Economic considerations 
to hazardous substances, strict liability, insurance ^, . . . ^ . . . , L j . _ . . . . . The application ofthe pnnciple cannot be divorced 
mechanisms, environmental impact assessments and „ KF . F . . . , , 
+u - * *· r . ι ι- · A -J from economic considerations which dominate 
the integration of environmental policy into wider , . . _. . _^ . . . 
decision-making 70 decision-making at many levels. The pnnciple requires 
0 r ' . r . . . . that economic costs be incurred to avert environmental Some formulations of the principle require , ^ L L .· • n 
. . . » . L L J - r damage. But how much precaution is economically 
precaution to be implemented by the adoption of L, o o . L J · J J / 
fi , , ,. „ .. , 71 _. :
 F , acceptable? Some governments have decided to 
clean production methods/1 This requires the use . . . . . . . · . 
c «u \ ι LI . L ι " /r. A^7 L reduce their reliance on the pnnciple on economic 
of best available technology (BAT) or the more , r . . n ... . . . . A ,. .. tt, .. . . . , ... grounds. For example, the British government stated discretionary best available technology not entailing * . . r 
excessive cost" (BATNEEC). Yet these approaches 
are not without difficulties. As Bodansky argued, it "prepared to take precautionary action to limit the 
would be unworkable if BAT was taken to mean use of potentially dangerous materials or the spread 
"available at any price" because that would result in of potentially dangerous pollutants, even where 
environmental hazards always being prioritised ahead scientific knowledge is not conclusive, if the 
of economic costs.72 There also are difficulties in balance oflikely costs and benefits justifies it. This 
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precautionary principle applies particularly where · there are threats of "serious or irreversible" 
there are good grounds forjudging ... that action damage80 
taken promptly at comparatively low cost may · there are "significant" risks of damage81 
avoid more costly damage later" (emphasis · there is "reason to assume" damage is "likely"82 
added).76 · there are "reasonable grounds for concern that 
~ . , . . . pollution may be caused"83 
Cameron argued that, to some extent, this is necessary # ^ 1 n „ „ ^ caused84 
because there are dangers in applying precaution at . ^ ¡g M ^ f o r ^ 1 ¡ 85 
any cost. For example, if high cost regulatory action . m e r e .g n o p r o o f o f harmleSsness
86 
is imposed and it is subsequently shown to be 
unnecessary, arguments will surface about economic It is not appropriate to select one evidentiary standard 
inefficiency, "thus reducing the force of subsequent for all situations. As the risk of harm increases, a 
precautionary arguments". Thus, the possible costs greater level of scientific uncertainty (entailing a lower 
of over-responding to uncertainty should be taken into evidentiary burden) can be accommodated when 
account when applying precaution.77 Further, engaging the principle. Further, the greater the level 
precautionary measures which have been imposed of anticipated harm, the more rigorous precautionary 
should be attenuated if they are subsequently found measures should be. The task now is to formulate 
to be unnecessary. appropriate thresholds for different areas of 
However, decision-makers need to guard against environmental management, 
economic considerations attaining paramountcy when 
considering precautionary measures. Otherwise the Shifling the burden of proof 
principle will be weakened substantially because the A unifying feature of most formulations of the 
most appropriate precautionary measures may not be principle is a shifting of the burden of proof, 
taken. The principle would become little more than a Traditionally, an activity will be permitted unless there 
cost-benefit analysis. The essence of precautionary is proof of likely and unacceptable harm. The burden 
philosophy entails that some "unnecessary" caution of proof necessarily falls on opponents ofthe activity, 
(with its associated costs) must be accepted. In many cases sufficient "proof is only available after 
harm has been caused. This occurred in relation to 
Threshold for application drift-net fishing where tens of thousands of seabirds 
While there is widespread acceptance ofthe need and porpoises died before regulators were satisfied 
for precautionary measures in environmental that drift nets damage marine life.87 It is the inability 
management, a controversial aspect surrounding the of the conventional burden of proof to provide an 
principle is the determination ofthe appropriate point effective legal response for environmental damage 
at which precautionary action should be taken for a which cannot conclusively be traced to the activities 
given activity. It is not in dispute that the principle is of one legal identity which gave rise to the principle 
only applicable where there is a lack of knowledge of precautionary action. The principle reverses the 
about or disagreement concerning possible, non- situation by mandating that a party cannot be permitted 
negligible environmental harm. The crucial question to act unless it is shown that the proposed activity 
is, how much evidence of "unacceptable" harm is will not adversely affect the environment. The impact 
necessary to warrant precautionary action?78 In 1986 of the principle on the burden of proof can be 
the West German government explained that the understood in two ways.88 Fjrst, there is a lesser 
Vorsorgeprinzip concept requires the taking of standard of proof: it is no longer necessary to have 
"[alctive measures ... if general experience or conclusive proof of harmful effects to justify the 
scientific findings indicate with sufficient ™pos.t.on of a particular regulatory regime -
u u / *, *u * Α ι/u A . environmental harm need only be plausible. But more 
probability that damage willbt caused; any remote f , . . . , 
possibility that damage will be caused is not ^nmûy,the evidentiary burden shifts as a result 
sufficient" (emphasis added).™ ofchangmg the party required to d,scharge the burden, 
usually that of showing that an emission or 
Some formulations fall only just short of calling for development will not cause serious environmental 
proof of significant harm. Various (often overlapping), degradation. When legal regimes are adopted to 
thresholds have been adopted, including where: implement the principle, different evidentiary burdens 
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may be advanced. For example, it may be that a institutional change. The strongest formulation ofthe 
prospective developer would be required to present a principle can be found in the 1989 Oslo Commission 
persuasive case ofthe unlikelihood of harm occurring, decision on the reduction and cessation of dumping 
but then opponents may be given the opportunity to of industrial wastes in the North Sea. The parties 
respond to the evidence. agreed that: 
Applying the principle " [ T ] h * d " m P i n S o f i n d u s t r i f w a s t e s i n t h e » o r t b 
ΓΓ J σ r r Sea shall cease ... except for inert matenals of 
A major criticism of the principle concerns the natural origin, and except for those industrial wastes 
difficulty in determining which precautionary for which it can be shown to the Commission 
measures are appropriate to take. There are divergent through the Prior Justification Procedure (PJP) both 
views on the level of precautionary action required that there areno practical alternatives on land and 
and when and how it should be applied. Often, a range that the materials cause no harm in the marine 
of precautionary measures will be available and the environment."91 
difficulty lies in choosing precautionary options when , ,. ·, 
action is being taken because of uncertainty. Where a 1 ^ b u r d e n o f P r o o f , s t h u s r e v e r s e d 8 ^ l t b e c o m e s 
proposed activity is identified as requiring application necessary for the applicant to demonstrate that the 
of the principle, there is essentially a choice of four a c t i v i t v w i H c a u s e " n o h a r m " b e f o r e I I c a n b e 
operational approaches to implement precaution: sanctioned. Such strong formulations ofthe pnnciple 
have provoked criticism because of the almost 
• completely reverse the burden impossible task of proving a negative proposition — 
of proof to require the proponent that no harm will be caused.
92 As Stebbing pointed 
to meet a high evidentiary out, "only disproof is logically conclusive" because 
standard pointing to repudiating what is false is the only act scientists can 
harmlessness before the activity perform with complete certainty.93 Insisting upon 
— or modified activity — may application of such formulations of the principle is 
be permitted; quixotic because, taken to its logical conclusion, the 
• approve the activity, contingent principle entails the prohibition of all activities about 
Decreasing o n a l ° w "acceptability" level of which there exists uncertainty as to environmental 
precautionary uncertainty, (determined in a effects — virtually every human activity, 
strength manner similar to cost-benefit Selecting appropriate thresholds for precautionary 
analyses or risk assessments); a c t i o n w i U ^ challenging. As Cameron pointed out, 
• approve the activity but require t h e u s e o f p r e c autionary language is often 
the proponent to use BAT or accompanied by the setting merely of preventive 
BATNEEC and conduct standards rather than precautionary standards. This 
stringent post-decision occurs where parties act to reduce a risk because they 
monitonng; ^ a c t m g m theknowledge that a dangerous outcome 
• apply precautionary measures ¡s p o s s i b l e ( o r probable) rather than because they are 
pursuanuo the doctrine of "no uncertain ^ t 0 any environmental effects.
94 The more 
ν egrets . t h a t j s ^ η θ λ ν η about a possible outcome, the less 
Formulations of the principle vary greatly as to their precautionary any measure will be to prevent it. The 
substantive requirements. In the particularly bland National Pollutant Inventory (NPl), established in 
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration state parties agreed May 1996, is an example. The Commonwealth 
merely that they will not use "lack of full scientific Environment Protection Agency employed 
certainty" as a reason for postponing "cost-effective" assimilative capacity language when it stated that "for 
precautionary measures where there are threats of a chemical to be included on the NPI, it must be known 
"serious" or "irreversible" damage (essentially a to, or reasonably expected to, cause serious health 
BATNEEC approach). There is a further subjective problems or severe damage to the environment".95 
proyiso: states are given latitude to apply the principle Thus, only those substances with clearly identified 
"according to their individual capabilities".90 Stricter hazard potential are listed. A substance about which 
formulations call for much greater social and there is much uncertainty as to its environmental 
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effects will not be included on the list because its risk In the application of the precautionary principle, 
has not been identified. Conceptually, this is a public and private decisions should be guided by: 
preventive approach. A truly precautionary approach ( i ) c a r efu l evaluation to avoid, wherever 
would involve applying regulatory standards to all practicable, serious or irreversible damage 
substances about which there exists uncertainty as to t 0 m e environment; and 
their environmental effects. This can be achieved by ( i i ) a n assesSment of the risk-weighted 
"reverse listing". The conventional regulatory consequences of various options." 
approach, as illustrated by the NPI, involves listing 
substances which cannot be discharged. Reverse Specific areas of environmental policy and 
listing entails a blanket prohibition except for listed management where the principle "should"99 be applied 
substances which have been demonstrated to be safe are identified in Schedules to the Agreement. These 
(or within acceptability criteria). Further, over time, are: 
precautionary standards can turn into preventive . Data collection and handling 
standards. For example, the Vienna Convention for . R e s o u r c e asseSsment, land use and approval 
the Protection of the Ozone Layer,96 signed in 1985, n m . .O C A e 
is itself precautionary because it was established . E n v i r o n m e n t a l ¡ t a s s e s s m e n t 
before there was conclusive evidence of ozone . N a t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t p r o t e c t i o n m e a s u r e s 
depletion/' However, with the increase m scientific m riimate chanse 
knowledge, much more is known about the . B i o l o g i c a l d i v e r s i t y 
environmentally damaging effects of CFCs so the VT .. , , . 
, , J .,. ö ö , ^ . . , . · National estate 
standards set prescribing controls for their production # w . , „ . 
and consumption are now better described as XT . 
\ · Nature conservation 
preventive rather than precautionary. 
The most effective operational approach would be A basic problem of the IGAE is that it is a political 
to modify the burden of proof to require a potential accord and is not binding on parties. The National 
polluter to present evidence of a high standard pointing Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development, 
to harmlessness or negligible harm. Precautionary although not employing the term "precautionary 
measures would be introduced where the magnitude principle", also adopted the principle, mirroring the 
of uncertainty (influenced by indications of potential IGAE definition.100 The principle is also included in 
harm) outweighs indications of benefit from a a number of specific environmental policy documents. 
proposed activity. This would enable precaution to The Guiding Principles for the Sustainable 
be implemented quickly and activities would be Management of Coastal Resources and the Draft 
permitted only where there is confidence that they National Strategy for Rangeland Management are just 
would not result in unacceptable harm. two examples. 
The status of the principle in Australia Legislation 
Policy documents Specific references to the precautionary principle, 
separate from its inclusion as a major component of 
The precautionary principle was firmly established E c o l o g i c a l l y Sustainable Development (ESD), are so 
domestically with the signing, in May 1992, ofthe f a r r a r e i n Australian legislation. The most significant 
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment r e f e r e n c e t 0 t h e p r i n c i p l e i n Commonwealth 
(IGAE) b>; the Commonwealth, States andTerritories , i s l a t i o n ig i n t h e Environmentt Sports and 
and the Local Government Association.« The Territories Ugisbakm Amendment Act 1995 which 
principle is one of four intended to inform „ g 3 , ^ ^ g 3 9 z o f m e G m j , Banier Regf 
environmental policy and programmes at all levels of „ ^ pmk Aa ^ 5 to ¡re t h e G r e a t Bmitr 
government. Under cl 3.5.1 the parties agreed that: R e e f M a f i n e p a f k A u t h o r i t y tQ ^ ¡ n f o r m e d b y ^ 
"Where there are threats of serious or irreversible principle in preparing management plans and 
environmental damage, lack of full scientific protecting World Heritage values. The Act adopts the 
certainty should not be used as a reason for IGAE definition ofthe principle.101 
postponing measures to prevent environmental There has been greater explicit endorsement of 
degradation. precaution in State legislation. The first Australian 
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legislative inclusion of the principle is contained in which is likely to adversely affect its essential 
the Protection of the Environment Administration Act behavioural patterns". The licence was granted and 
1991 (NSW). Section 6(2) outlines the principles of an appeal on the merits ofthe decision was instituted. 
ESD and specifies that it can be achieved (in part) by Stein J noted the inclusion of the precautionary 
implementing: principle in Commonwealth strategies respecting 
ttrrT^, . . , , endangered species and biodiversity, the IGAE and 
[T]he precautionary pnnciple - namely, that if ^ Protection φ η £ E n v i w n m e n t A d m i n i s t r a t i o n A c t 
there are threats of serious or irreversible , 9 9 , ( N S W ) a n d c o n c i u d e d i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e 
env^onmental damage, lack of full scientific N g t i m a l Parks m d m d n f e A c t , 9 7 5 t h a t : 
certainty should not be used as a reason for 
postponing measures to prevent environmental "While there is no express provision requiring 
degradation." consideration of the 'precautionary principle', 
^ . . , . , . , „ . . . . , consideration of the state of knowledge or 
The principle is also in the Fisheries Management n't H* th notential for 
Act 1994 (NSW)'«2 and is contained in some pieces ^ 8 ¿ ù ^ i b î ï h î ^ m e i i L g e i B d f a u n a 
of'egislation as a specific ally mentioned component a n d t h e ^ ¡ o n o f & c a u t i o u s h ¡n 
of ESD. For example, the objectives of the protection of endangered fauna is clearly consistent 
Environment Protection Act 1993 (SA) include ., .u . . . . _ r.u~ 
, t4 „ f , , . . . with the subject matter, scope and purpose of the 
ensunngthat all reasonable and practicable measures A .„,07 
are taken to protect, restore and enhance the quality 
of the environment having regard to the principles of His Honour held that the Director-General must have 
ESD" and "to apply a precautionary approach to the regard to the distribution, habitat depletion and 
assessment of risk of environmental harm".103 ultimate security of the species and to this end the 
However, legislative intent that decision-makers "commonsense" principle is not an "extraneous 
should consider the principle can be found further consideration". He continued: "Application of the 
afield. As precaution is accepted as a guiding principle precautionary principle appears to me to be most apt 
of ESD, it must be recognised as implicit in any in a situation of a scarcity of scientific knowledge of 
statement of ESD.104 Thus, references to ESD in species population, habitat and impacts."108 He noted 
legislation would entail a consideration of the the "dearth of knowledge"m about the population, 
principle.105 Unfortunately, existing legislative habitat and behavioural patterns of the frog and 
incorporations of the principle and the ESD concept refused the licence because of inadequate scientific 
are worded generally and reflect an intent to advance understanding ofthe possible impacts of road building 
precautionary decision-making but not to mandate on the species. Leatch provides a clear example of 
particular environmental outcomes based on how the precautionary principle can operate as a 
precautionary criteria. determining factor in environmental decisions.110 
Optimism that the New South Wales Land and 
Judicial application Environment Court was going to establish a firm basis 
Not surprisingly, there is very little Australian for the application of the principle was shaken 
jurisprudence on the principle. The first and most somewhat by obiter dicta of Talbot J in Nicholls ν 
significant judicial consideration of it was given in Director-General of National Parks and Wildlife 
1993 by Stein J of the New South Wales Land and Service.111 His Honour noted that the State department 
Environment Court in Leatch ν National Parks and was not bound to take into account standards 
Wildlife Service.106 The Shoalhaven City Council formulated at the international level and indicated that 
proposed to construct a road in an area known to be a the implementation ofthe principle as a legal standard 
habitat of the Giant Burrowing Frog, listed as an "could have the potential to create interminable 
endangered species. The council applied to the forensic argument. Taken literally in practice it might 
Director-General of the National Parks and Wildlife prove to be unworkable".112 Just two months later, in 
Service for a licence to "take or kill" endangered Greenpeace Australia Ltd ν Redbank Power Co Pty 
fauna, as was required by the National Parks and Ltd,m in dismissing an appeal against the grant of a 
Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW). The definition of "take" in development application for the establishment and 
s 5 (since repealed) included the disturbance, injury operation of a coal-fired power station, Pearlman J 
or "significant modification ofthe habitat ofthe fauna stated: 
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"The application of the precautionary principle give consideration to the limitations of scientific 
dictates that a cautious approach should be adopted evidence which is implicit in the precautionary 
in evaluating the various relevant factors in principle. The decision indicates that the courts will 
determining whether or not to grant consent; it does not be rigorous when considering whether decision-
not require that the greenhouse issue should makers have acted with requisite caution. The 
outweigh all other issues."114 evidence relied upon by the Minister was a fresh — 
~. . . . ,. ., ^ n f c . ... . although equivocal — scientific opinion on the The pnnciple was discussed by Gallen J of the High . . * L ι w u r f t - fM 7 ι ^· r κι r, ι i restorative capacity of orange roughy stock which Court of New Zealand in Greenpeace New Zealand . ,. , . . -Λ™-, ,,, T . · u ι ι 
t Λ*·. si? · , us ̂ u A indicated that the TACC could be set at a higher level 
lnc ν Minister of Fisheries. The case concerned an , , . . . , . 
application for review of a decision by the Minister t h a n h a d P 1 ™ 0 " ^ «*en thought appropriate, 
of Fisheries determining the total allowable A l t í ° u S h G*"en} ™ t e d thaJ sc'fnt,StS w U h t h e 
commercial catch (TACC) for the orange roughy fish h l « h e s t qualifications were unable to agree on a 
cr^ñoc ç~r*u~ mm inn/i « w TU Ι· • number of issues relating to the orange roughy 
species for the 1993-1994 fishing year. The applicant ^ 1 „ , , , , . , , , , t . . . , _, . · ,, 
contended that where there was significant scientific Γ ΐ δ ^ ' h e h e l d m a t t h e M m i S t e r u
S d e C 1 S 1 0 n C O u l d 
uncertainty regarding fish stock levels, "the Minister n o t ** s e e n a s unreasonable because there was matenal 
should take a precautionary approach so as to set a which jiistìfiedthe Minister coming to the conclusion 
TACC which will best manage and conserve the which he did. , . . _, L L 
fishery". »* Gallen J referred to the decision in Leatch Nonetheless, these decisions demonstrate that the 
and stated that there could be little doubt that the Pr i n c iP l e h a s b e e n a f f o r d e d a d e ^ r e e o f l e g a l 
approach adopted in that case would apply also in recognition. It is now unlikely that, in the 
New Zealand. However, he commented that: environmental arena, it could be held to be an 
irrelevant consideration. Indeed, Leatch established 
"[T]o state that something must be approached with that, although there is no legal duty to apply the 
caution means just that. The fact that a dispute exists principle, it should now be considered a factor to be 
as to the basic material upon which the decision taken into account in appropriate circumstances. The 
must rest, does not mean that necessarily the most High Court recently held that there is a "legitimate 
conservative approach must be adopted. The expectation" that Commonwealth discretion will be 
obligation is to consider the material and decide exercised in conformity with the terms of international 
upon the weight which can be given it with such conventions to which Australia is a party,123 thus 
care as the situation requires."117 reinforcing this view. Yet there is no clear guidance 
His Honour noted that there was no statutory a s t o t h e circumstances in which the principle is a 
obligation on the Minister to apply the precautionary relevant consideration. It is easier for courts to apply 
principle but accepted that there was "a movement t h e Principle if they are empowered to conduct merits 
towards a view that in questions of such moment, a r e v i e w o f decisions (such as in Leatch) rather than 
degree of caution is appropriate". To this end, a judicial review (such as in Greenpeace New Zealand). 
precautionary approach "is a weighting and not a However, given the vague language used in legislation 
decisive factor".118 He concluded: enshrining the principle, the courts have been given 
an insubstantial mandate to enforce it. The formulation 
"In assessing the information upon which a decision o f t h e principle in the few pieces of legislation which 
must be based, the precautionary principle ought a d o p t ¡t i n d i c a t e s t h a t i t i s m o s t l i k e l y t 0 ^ applied as 
to be applied so that where uncertainty or ignorance a ^ pnncìpìe o f s t a t u t o r y interpretation and not 
exists, decision-makers should be cautious" a s a legally enforceable rule.
124 
(emphasis added).119 T h e prìncìpìe n e e d s t 0 ^ adopted in a manner 
On the evidence before him, Gallen J considered which would establish it as a mandatory consideration 
that the TACC set by the Minister could not be in environmental matters in all Australian jurisdictions 
criticised for "want of caution" because it was a due to the reasons stated above. That this is not yet 
decision "arrived at consistently with expert evidence" the case is unsatisfactory because decision-makers can 
placed before the Minister.120 In accepting that the ignore the principle in circumstances in which its 
Minister was cautious merely by his acting consistently consideration or application is appropriate. A recent 
with available scientific evidence, Gallen J failed to example of this shortcoming is the decision of Martin 
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CJ of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory in of similar releases elsewhere cannot be sustained. The 
Northern Land Council ν Energy Resources of claim that there has been "no noticeable [e]ffect" 
Australia Ltd.125 The case concerned an application concerning released waters needed to be analysed in 
by the Northern Land Council and six Aboriginal terms of the effectiveness of existing monitoring 
residents for an interim injunction restraining the programmes. The decision also glossed-over the 
defendant from releasing water into the Magela Creek potential forfuture environmental effects which may 
or its environs from Ranger Uranium Mine Retention only manifest themselves after a long period. Although 
Pond No 2.126 The second plaintiff, Mr Big Bill consideration of the precautionary principle in this 
Neidjie, deposed that he was "frightened by the case may have resulted in the same decision, at least 
proposed release of water" in that he feared it would the proceedings would have commenced from the 
"kill the trees, waterlillies and other water plants".127 position that the release of water would not be 
Concerns were also expressed that people who drink permitted unless the weight of adequate scientific 
the water or eat produce from the area after the evidence dispelled any reasonable concerns about 
discharge may be affected. In dismissing the possible environmental harm, 
application, Martin CJ stated that the 
"fear arises from a belief that the water is Conclusion 
contaminated — 'poisoned' — by uranium and The precautionary principle emerged in 
other toxic substances. There isno evidence toshow environmental discourse in recognition of the need 
that the proposed discharge would have any such for a framework for decision-making which would be 
affect [sic]. On the other hand, the evidence on adequate to deal with the increasingly complicated 
behalf of the first defendant is that the contaminants nature of environmental problems. It is the foremost 
in the water to be released .. will cause no harm example of legal recognition of the aggregate nature 
to people or the wider environment. .. Although 0f environmental harm and the potential for harm to 
this is the first time it is proposed that water be be irreparable. It is not a lofty ideal, but an approach 
released from Retention Pond No 2, water from which is necessary. It has achieved a degree of 
Retention Pond No 1 is allowed to be released fully conceptual clarity and its continued acceptance in 
every year, and since the mid 1980's [sic], water international and domestic environmental fora 
from Retention Pond No 4 has been released in most indicates that its future as a leading environmental 
years. The dilution requirements in respect of the principle is secure. Some foresee it as developing into 
release of water from Retention Pond No 2 means »the fundamental principle of environmental 
that the impact on the environment of the water protection policy at the international, regional, and 
released from it will be identical to that released i o c a j levels".
130 
from the other two ponds in respect of which there However, to date, in Australia, the principle's most 
has been no noticeable affect [sic]. ...Though the important test — implementation — has been 
individual plaintiffs may genuinely have been bedevilled by problems. Existing legislative and policy 
frightened as to the possible consequences to arise formulations are too vague or ambiguous to enable it 
from a release of the water, there is no foundation t 0 ^ implemented systematically. Its practical use is 
for that belief. The^evidence is all the other way" c u r r e n t l y limited because decision-makers are not 
(emphasis added).m bound to apply it and are in doubt as to how to apply 
The case demonstrates the inappropriateness of the it. Although the federal government has embraced the 
existing burden of proof by which plaintiffs (often principle internationally and domestically, the current 
concerned residents) must adduce evidence to "show" practice of repeatedly espousing the principle as a 
that activities "would" result in environmental harm.129 guide to environmental decision-making is not 
Further, the scientific evidence led by the defendant sufficient to discharge the Commonwealth's obligation 
was unchallenged by the plaintiffs or Martin CJ. to ensure the principle is "widely applied".131 It must 
Considering the preceding discussion, it is untenable be given effect. 
to argue that there is irrefutable evidence that the The principle is in a crucial transitional phase, 
release "will cause no harm". Likewise, the complexity While its merits as an environmental philosophy are 
of environmental interactions means that the argument virtually unquestioned, the debate has shifted to the 
that environmental impacts will be "identical" to that more difficult aspect of its potential to amount to more 
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than a nebulous "guiding principle" for environmental to be deferential to departmental interpretations of the 
protection. The argument that the principle is principle and not go beyond determining it to be a 
incapable of being given clear definition is waning. non-binding "relevant consideration". For the 
Thresholds for its application can be determined and principle to be implemented effectively, it must be 
appropriate precautionary responses can be adopted. integrated into the most sophisticated environmental 
Although the principle's success at the international protection framework that we have — environmental 
level has led to the perception that it is relevant only impact assessment. The Environment Protection 
to "macro" level policy as a response to transboundary (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 (Cth) is the "main 
harm and threats to the global commons, it is apposite plank"132 of the Commonwealth's environmental 
for the entire spectrum of environmental decision- powers and is the logical starting point for reform 
making, including individual development decisions. options. 
For the federal government to give effect to its The principle's progressive quality lies in the 
international obligations to implement the principle opportunity it creates to mandate a commonsense 
and to be seen as taking the ESD concept seriously, it approach to environmental decision-making and to 
must apply the principle so that it influences decisions form the basis for an effective regulatory regime, 
and environmental management practices. Operative Rather than continuing merely to repeat the principle 
standards need to be adopted which, at minimum, in hortatory terms, the federal government must shift 
would be in conformity with Australia's international attention to developing specific operating criteria or 
obligations and, ideally, would position Australia at "rules" which must ensure the application of some 
the forefront of nations implementing the principle. minimum content and not allow precaution to be 
This would require greater legislative commitment and diminished. Otherwise the principle faces the prospect 
the creation of enforcement mechanisms. In the of being reduced merely to an unachievable aspiration 
absence of clearly defined regulations, courts are likely for environmental management. 
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